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Post-Caremark Implications for Health Care 
Organization Boards of Directors 
Kimberly D. Baker & Arissa M. Peterson1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the government has devoted substantial resources to 
investigate and prosecute health care fraud and abuse.  The increase in 
governmental prosecutorial activity in the health care industry can be traced 
to two significant trends: (1) concern over waste, fraud, and abuse as one of 
the Department of Justice’s top priorities, and (2) increased awareness of 
the economic benefits of qui tam (whistleblower) suits.  In the last several 
years, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) have encouraged the health care 
community to prevent and reduce fraud and abuse in federal health care 
programs by implementing an effective compliance program.  In 1996, a 
Delaware Chancery Court held in In re Caremark Int’l Inc., Derivative 
Litigation that the failure of a corporate director to make a good faith 
attempt at instituting an effective compliance program may, in some 
situations, constitute a breach of a director’s fiduciary obligations.2  The 
decision in Caremark changed the landscape of individual liability for 
boards of directors by making it easier for members of boards of directors to 
be held liable.3  Because of this decision and increased scrutiny by the 
government, health care organizations should implement and carry out 
effective corporate-compliance programs.  The risk of personal liability for 
directors who fail to oversee compliance has risen as fiduciary doctrines 
have been reinforced.  
This article will focus on the Caremark decision and a director’s duty to 
oversee compliance with federal and state laws and regulations.  First, the 
article will examine a board of director’s liability under the theory of 
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fiduciary duties.  Next, the article will discuss Caremark and the impact of 
its holding, as well as the additional layer of scrutiny imposed by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act that went into effect in 2002.  Finally, this article will 
provide guidelines for implementing a corporate-compliance program that 
will satisfy Caremark.  Directors face personal liability during this time of 
enhanced awareness of corporate responsibility.  Accordingly, it is essential 
that a health care organization be familiar with Caremark and its 
implications for compliance, otherwise organizations may face harsh civil 
and criminal penalties.4  The Caremark decision and its progeny, as well as 
the recent passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act governing corporate conduct, 
make the implementation and adherence to a corporate-compliance program 
critical to the success of health care organizations.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Fiduciary Duty Overview 
Health care organizations are subject to substantial state and federal 
regulatory requirements.  The board of directors of a health care 
organization is, in broad terms, responsible for the conduct of the 
organization’s business.  Typically, in a larger corporation, the day-to-day 
management responsibilities are delegated to the executives and other 
senior staff.  However, this delegation does not release the directors from 
responsibility to oversee the actions of senior management.  All corporate 
boards are accountable to certain groups.  In publicly owned corporations, 
the directors are accountable to the individual shareholders.  A director may 
be found personally liable for failing to carry out his or her fiduciary duties.  
The usual mechanism for establishing personal liability is through a 
derivative suit, brought by shareholders or members on behalf of the 
corporation against the directors and officers. 5   
The role of a director is primarily one of monitoring—to review financial 
information and to oversee the organization’s compliance with state and 
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federal laws and regulations.  In order to carry out their duties, the directors 
must have a sufficient understanding of the nature of the business, as well 
as the management and information structures in place to determine if each 
structure is adequate to perform its respective role.  Directors of both for-
profit and nonprofit health care organizations are subject to the duty of care 
in the oversight of the business, including business performance and 
compliance with applicable laws and regulations.  According to the OIG, 
the duty of care requires that a director make decisions (1) in “good faith,” 
(2) with that level of care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise 
in like circumstances, and (3) in a manner that he or she reasonably believes 
is in the best interest of the corporation.6  Board members are not generally 
held liable for an organizational decision if it is consistent with the duty of 
care.7 
Directors may face potential liability for a breach of the duty of care for 
failing to exercise appropriate attention in two distinct contexts.  First, 
liability may follow from a board decision that results in a loss because that 
board decision was ill advised or negligent.8  Second, liability to the 
corporation for a loss may arise from an unconsidered failure of the board to 
act in circumstances where due attention would have prevented the loss 
(i.e., the duty to monitor).9  Liability usually stems from the business 
judgment rule, which states that the decision must be the product of a 
process that was either deliberately considered in good faith or was 
otherwise rational.10  Directors may be exempt from liability under the 
business judgment rule if the decisions were made in good faith, the director 
was disinterested and reasonably informed under the circumstances, and the 
director rationally believed the decision was in the best interest of the 
corporation.11   
This article will focus on a board of director’s duty of care in monitoring 
corporate operations and ensuring compliance with state and federal laws 
and regulations.  While a board’s decision will normally be subject to the 
business judgment rule, the changing landscape of corporate responsibility 
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and compliance has altered the meaning of “duty of care” to allow for the 
personal liability of directors who fail to monitor corporate activities to 
minimize and respond to legal liability.   
B.  Caremark and Its Progeny:  Expanded Liability for Health Care Boards 
of Directors 
In 1996, the Delaware Chancery Court expanded personal liability for 
members of a board of directors by recognizing that a director’s failure to 
implement and carry out an effective corporate-compliance program may, in 
some circumstances, render a director liable.12  The Caremark decision 
arose from a proposed settlement of a consolidated derivative action on 
behalf of Caremark International, Inc. (Caremark) involving claims against 
Caremark’s board of directors for violations of federal and state laws.   
Caremark is a Delaware corporation that was formed in 1992 with its 
headquarters in Illinois.13  The corporation was a spin-off of Baxter 
International, Inc., and became a publicly held company listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange.14  For the relevant time period relating to the lawsuit, 
Caremark provided both patient care and managed care services as its main 
health care business.15  During the relevant time period, Caremark had 
7,000 employees and ninety branch operations.16  The majority of 
Caremark’s revenues were derived from the patient care services, which 
involved alternative site health care services, including infusion therapy, 
growth hormone therapy, HIV/AIDS-related treatments and hemophilia 
therapy.17  Caremark’s managed care services included prescription drug 
programs and multi-specialty group practices.18  Like many health care 
organizations, a substantial part of Caremark’s revenues were derived from 
third-party payments, insurers, and Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement 
programs.19   
The Caremark lawsuit involved claims that the members of the Caremark 
Board of Directors (the Board) breached their duty of care to the 
corporation.  The plaintiffs alleged that the board was negligent when it 
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failed to adequately address violations of federal and state laws and 
regulations that were allegedly committed by Caremark employees.  The 
allegations included violations of the Anti-Referral Payments Law (ARPL) 
(unlawful “kickbacks”); unlawful billing practices, including excessive and 
medically unnecessary treatments for patients, potentially improper waivers 
of patient co-payment obligations; and, inadequate records maintained at 
Caremark pharmacies.20  As a result of the alleged violations, Caremark was 
subject to an extensive four-year investigation by the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Justice, 
which resulted in an indictment for multiple felonies.21  Caremark entered 
into a number of agreements, including a plea agreement in which it 
pleaded guilty to a single felony of mail fraud and agreed to pay civil and 
criminal fines.22  Later, Caremark agreed to pay reimbursements to various 
public and private parties totaling approximately $250 million.23   
In response to the governmental investigation, the Board took several 
steps consistent with an effort to assure compliance with company policies 
concerning the ARPL.24  Throughout the period of governmental 
investigations, Caremark had an internal audit plan designed to assure 
compliance with business and ethics policies.25  In addition, Caremark took 
additional steps aimed at increasing management supervision, including 
adopting new policies for local branch managers to certify compliance with 
the ethics program.26   
The Caremark court explained that to establish director liability for 
breaching the duty to exercise appropriate attention to potentially illegal 
corporate activities was “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation 
law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”27  Without a 
conflict of interest or facts demonstrating suspect motivation, it is difficult 
to charge directors with responsibility for corporate losses for an alleged 
breach of care.28  Director liability under this theory may arise from (1) a 
board decision that resulted in a loss because the decision was ill-advised, 
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or (2) “an unconsidered failure of the board to act in circumstances in which 
due attention would, arguably, have prevented the loss.”29   
Board member inattention can be a basis for director liability, even 
though most corporate decisions are not subject to director attention.30  “[A] 
director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a 
corporate information and reporting system, which the [b]oard concludes is 
adequate, exists, and that failure to do so under some circumstances may, in 
theory at least, render a director liable for losses caused by non-compliance 
with applicable legal standards.”31  Ordinary business decisions made by 
officers and employees deeper in the corporation can significantly injure the 
corporation and make it subject to criminal sanctions.32   
The level of detail needed for an information system is a matter of 
business judgment.  The Caremark decision set a high standard that, in 
some circumstances, could result in liability for seemingly minor actions.  
Under the Caremark standard, directors may be held personally liable for 
losses caused by failing to maintain reasonable information and reporting 
systems, or failing to monitor and improve suspect practices that have been 
brought to the board’s attention.   
[I]t is important that the board exercise a good faith judgment that 
the corporation’s information and reporting system is in concept 
and design adequate to assure the board that appropriate 
information will come to its attention in a timely manner as a 
matter of ordinary operations, so that it may satisfy its 
responsibility.33 
While unconsidered inaction, in theory, can render a director liable, no 
Caremark directors were found personally liable.  Caremark enhanced a 
director’s risk of liability by opening the door to increased scrutiny and 
reinforcement of the duty to monitor.  
Subsequent cases opened the door to personal liability for directors even 
further.  In 2001, the Sixth Circuit expanded Caremark by eliminating the 
need for directors to act intentionally to harm the corporation.34  McCall v. 
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Scott involved a consolidated stockholder derivative action brought against 
current and former directors of Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation, the 
owner and operator of nearly half of all the for-profit hospitals in the United 
States.35  The complaint alleged that the Columbia board knew of senior 
management efforts to devise schemes to improperly increase revenue and 
profits and perpetuate a management philosophy that provided strong 
incentives for employees to commit fraud.36  The McCall court concluded 
that the decision in Caremark does not require a director to have 
intentionally acted to harm the corporation.37  The court reviewed the 
factual allegations only for the purpose of examining the sufficiency of the 
pleadings with respect to demand futility.38  The complaint cited significant 
factors indicating that the board must have been aware of the fraud, 
including (1) audit discrepancies between cost reports submitted to the 
government and secret reserve reports, (2) improper acquisition practices in 
which at least one of the directors personally was involved, (3) a qui tam 
action alleging a widespread strategy to engage in violations of federal law, 
and (4) an extensive criminal investigation that included raids on thirty-five 
Columbia facilities in six different states.39  These particularized facts were 
sufficient to present a substantial likelihood of liability on the part of at least 
five of Columbia’s directors.40  
A significant factor in the court’s conclusion was the prior experience of 
a number of the defendant directors.41  Given the defendants’ prior 
experience in business and/or as board members, the court in McCall was 
persuaded that the failure to react to the criminal investigation and other 
“red flags” created a strong inference of intentional or reckless disregard.42  
Thus, 
when director liability is predicated upon ignorance of liability-
creating activities, “only a sustained or systematic failure of the 
board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to 
assure a reasonable information reporting system exists—will 
establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to 
liability.”43 
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In 2002, the Seventh Circuit followed suit with McCall and again 
expanded personal liability for directors.44  In Re Abbott Laboratories 
Derivative Shareholders Litigation involved a shareholder derivative suit 
against Abbott’s board of directors.  The plaintiffs alleged that the directors 
breached their fiduciary duties created in a consent decree, resulting in harm 
to the corporation.  The harm included paying a $100 million civil fine to 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), withdrawing 125 types of 
medical diagnostic test kits from the U.S. market, destroying certain 
inventory, and making a number of corrective changes in its manufacturing 
procedures after six years of federal violations.45  Plaintiffs maintained that 
the directors were aware of the six-year history of noncompliance problems 
with the FDA and that they had a duty to take necessary action to correct 
these problems.46  During a six-year period, the FDA conducted thirteen 
separate inspections of Abbott’s facilities.47  The FDA sent four formal 
certified warning letters to Abbott, cautioning that failure to correct certain 
deviations could result in severe regulatory action.48  Because information 
concerning the violations had been made known to the general public early 
in the six-year period, the plaintiffs maintained that the directors had a duty 
under rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) to comply with “comprehensive government regulations.”49   
The court found that the directors’ actions fell outside the protection of 
the business judgment rule by examining the magnitude and duration of the 
alleged wrongful conduct.50  The court concluded that unlike the board 
members in Caremark, the board members in Abbot were aware of the 
problems.51  The court noted that “[t]he facts in Abbott do not support the 
conclusion that the directors were ‘blamelessly unaware of the conduct 
leading to the corporate liability.’”52  Accordingly, the court held that the 
plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded allegations of a breach of the duty of good 
faith that, if true, led one to reasonably conclude that the directors’ actions 
fell outside the protection of the business judgment rule.53  
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The Caremark holding did not make any monumental changes to 
corporate law.  Yet, the Caremark court specifically addressed the issue of 
corporate directors’ individual liability for failing to adequately monitor a 
corporation’s activities.  While the Caremark directors were not found to 
have breached the duty of care by failing to monitor the organization’s 
activities, the Caremark decision has set a demanding standard that can be 
imposed on boards of directors of health care organizations.  The McCall 
and Abbott decisions demonstrate that something less than intentional 
conduct may result in personal liability.  First and foremost, “the magnitude 
and duration of the alleged wrongdoing is relevant in determining whether 
the failure of the directors to act constitutes a lack of good faith.”54  Specific 
factors gleaned from Caremark, McCall, and Abbott may include 
experience on the board and prior board experience, knowledge of ongoing 
government or SEC investigations, and the public’s general knowledge of 
wrongdoing or non-compliance, all of which may be indicative of a board’s 
“unconsidered inaction” under the Caremark standard.55 
C.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
In addition to Caremark and decisions following, an additional layer of 
scrutiny has been added in light of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA), which 
was signed into law on July 30, 2002.56  The SOA was intended to promote 
disclosure of corporate wrongdoing.  Publicly held companies and those 
companies required to file reports under the Securities and Exchange Act 
section 15(d) must be attentive to the prohibitions under section 806 of the 
SOA and the civil remedial measures afforded to whistleblowers who report 
a reasonable belief of misconduct.57  The act provides for expansive civil 
sanctions and establishes timelines and burdens of proof that are markedly 
different from whistleblower claims in most other employment settings. 
Given its breadth of making individuals potentially liable and its harsh 
fines and/or imprisonment for criminal misconduct, the SOA surpasses all 
other similar acts.  Section 806 of the SOA, the civil provisions, affords 
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federal protection for whistleblowers who work for a company with a class 
of securities registered under section 12 of the Security Exchange Act of 
1934 (SEA) (15 U.S.C. § 781) or those who work for a company that is 
required to file reports under section 15(d) of the SEA (15 U.S.C. § 
780(d)).58  Section 806 amends 18 U.S.C. by adding section 1514A, which 
prohibits retaliatory conduct toward anyone who participates in the lawful 
reporting of violations concerning financially fraudulent company 
activities.59  In order to receive protection under this statute, the 
whistleblower must reasonably believe that the activities constitute a 
violation of (1) federal securities law, (2) SEC rules or regulations, or (3) 
other federal law provisions that relate to shareholder fraud.60 
The three key elements necessary to receive protection under the act are 
reporting, individual liability, and criminal liability.  To warrant protection 
under the SOA, the alleged violations must be reported to a law 
enforcement officer or to someone with supervisory authority or authority 
to investigate, discover, or correct the violations.61  Section 806 provides 
protection for employees who report a reasonable belief of the occurrence 
of a civil violation of sections 1341, 1343, 1344, and 1348 of Title 18 of the 
U.S. Code.62  Section 1107 provides criminal penalties for any individual 
who knowingly, and with the intent to retaliate, takes harmful action against 
an employee who provides law enforcement with truthful information about 
a commission or potential commission of any federal offense.63  The 
criminal penalties of section 1107 are not exclusive to those sections of 
Title 18 of the U.S. Code to which section 806 pertains.  Under section 
1107, criminal liability attaches to both private and public companies and 
nonprofit organizations.64   
Health care organizations need to be aware of the SOA and the penalty 
scheme imposed for violations.  This act provides for whistleblower and 
retaliation protection as well as individual liability for violations.  In 
implementing corporate-compliance programs, organizations need to 
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understand the SOA and its applicability to the organization, as well as 
create compliance programs and policies tailored to meet its requirements.   
D.  Suggestions for Implementing Effective Compliance Programs 
In evaluating the fiduciary duties of the board of directors, board 
members need to be especially diligent about acting in good faith to assure 
that adequate corporate information and reporting systems exist.  
Implementing an effective compliance program is critical for insulating 
health care organizations from harsh criminal and civil sanctions and 
exclusion from federal programs.  An effective compliance program extends 
through many layers of the organization.  Caremark is particularly 
instructive in reinforcing the need for a tailored compliance program 
specific to the health care organization.  While Caremark and other cases 
have established the directors’ duty to oversee compliance programs, none 
provide a specific methodology to structure such a program.   
On April 2, 2003, the OIG in collaboration with the American Health 
Lawyers Association (AHLA) published Corporate Responsibility and 
Corporate Compliance:  A Resource for Health Care Boards of Directors 
(hereinafter referred to as the “OIG Guidance”).65  While this guidance is a 
good starting point for board members, it is not a “one size fits all” exacting 
standard.66  The purpose of the guidance is to help directors of both profit 
and nonprofit health care organizations perform organizational oversight 
and ask probing questions about compliance.67  In the wake of several 
accounting scandals such as Enron and the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, the guidance serves as a reminder of the obligations of corporate 
directors and of the increased attention by government regulators on health 
care organizations’ corporate compliance.   
As a preliminary matter, each health care organization is unique and 
should carefully examine its legal compliance requirements.  A compliance 
program should address the myriad of federal and state statutes and 
regulations that apply to the organization, including, but not limited to (1) 
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health care fraud and abuse laws (for example, anti-kickback, physician 
self-referral and false claims laws), (2) conflicts of interest and business 
ethics laws, (3) privacy laws and regulations (including Heath Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and other state privacy laws), 
and (4) the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.68  For instance, compliance with SOA and 
other federal statutes requires an understanding of complex civil and 
criminal penalty schemes. 
According to the OIG Guidance, there are seven essential elements to an 
effective compliance program for any health care organization and these 
seven elements are modeled on the seven steps of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines.69  At a minimum, all compliance programs aimed at reducing 
health care fraud and abuse should include the following seven elements: 
1. The development and distribution of written standards of 
conduct, as well as written policies and procedures that 
promote the hospital’s commitment to compliance (e.g., 
by including adherence to compliance as an element in 
evaluating managers and employees) that address specific 
areas of potential fraud, such as claims development and 
submission processes, code naming, and financial 
relationships with physicians and other health care 
professionals; 
2. The designation of a chief compliance officer and other 
appropriate bodies, for example, a corporate-compliance 
committee charged with the responsibility of operating 
and monitoring the compliance program, who report 
directly to the CEO and the governing body; 
3. The development and implementation of regular, effective 
education and training programs for all affected 
employees; 
4. The maintenance of a process, such as a hotline, to 
receive complaints, and the adoption of procedures to 
protect the anonymity of complainants and to protect 
whistleblowers from retaliation; 
Post-Caremark Implications for Boards of Directors 399 
VOLUME 3 • ISSUE 1 • 2004 
5. The development of a system to respond to the allegations 
of improper/illegal activities and the enforcement of 
appropriate disciplinary action against employees who 
have violated internal compliance policies, applicable 
statutes, regulations or federal health care program 
requirements; 
6. The use of audits and/or other evaluation techniques to 
monitor compliance and assist in the reduction of 
identified problem areas; and  
7. The investigation and remediation of identified systemic 
problems and the development of policies addressing the 
non-employment or retention of sanctioned individuals.70 
The OIG Guidance expanded the seven elements into a more detailed 
overview of corporate responsibility and guidance on structuring a 
compliance program.  In addition to an overview of a board’s duty to 
implement and oversee compliance, the OIG Guidance provides directors 
with a list of eighteen questions that they can ask their organization’s 
management team to better educate themselves regarding their 
organization’s compliance efforts and help protect themselves from 
unnecessary exposure to liability.71   
1.  Structural Implementation 
A board of directors should determine the key employees responsible for 
the implementation of the compliance program because the success of the 
program relies upon assigning high-level personnel to oversee the 
implementation and operations.72  When management is decentralized, as 
was the case in Caremark, it is important to assign key employees across 
levels of management to oversee compliance.  For example, adopting 
policies and procedures for local branch managers to certify compliance is a 
good way to avoid problems associated with decentralized management.  A 
board may want to establish a committee to monitor compliance program 
operations and regularly report to the board.73  An organization must have a 
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compliance reporting system whereby the board receives reports on a 
regular basis.74 
A solid understanding of the rationale and objectives of the compliance 
program, as well as its goals and inherent limitations is essential if the board 
is to evaluate the reasonableness of its design and effectiveness of its 
operations.75  The board needs to be realistic about its goals and 
limitations.76  Compliance programs will not prevent all wrongful conduct; 
however, the board can be satisfied that mechanisms are in place to ensure 
the timely reporting of suspected violations and to evaluate and implement 
remedial measures.77  For instance, the Caremark board took several steps 
to assure compliance with company policies concerning alleged violations 
of federal and state statutes.78 
The compliance program should address the significant risks of the 
organization.79  A comprehensive and ongoing process of compliance risk 
assessment is important to the board’s awareness of new challenges to the 
organization.  Compliance risk assessment is also important for the board’s 
evaluation of management priorities and program resource allocation.80  
From the beginning, the board must address the resources necessary to 
implement and to carry out the compliance program.81  The investment can 
be significant and requires a long-term commitment of resources for 
continuous oversight and improvement of the program.82  The investment 
may include annual budgetary commitments and human resources dedicated 
to compliance.83 
2.  Operational Compliance 
A code of conduct is fundamental to a successful compliance program 
because it articulates the organization’s commitment to ethical behavior.84  
The code should detail the fundamental principles, values, and framework 
for action within the organization.85  The code helps define the 
organization’s culture and its commitment to unearthing potential illegal 
conduct within the organization.86  Codes are beneficial only if they are 
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meaningfully communicated throughout the organization and enforced.87  
The organization should have zero tolerance for non-compliance with the 
code of conduct.  In addition, the organization should implement policies 
and procedures to address compliance risk areas and establish internal 
controls to counter vulnerabilities.88  Because health care laws and 
regulations often change, an organization’s policies and procedures need 
periodic review and revision if appropriate.89  Regular communication with 
counsel can assist the board in its oversight responsibilities in the changing 
regulatory environment.90   
The organization must assign a compliance officer who has the autonomy 
and sufficient resources to perform assessments and respond appropriately 
to misconduct.91  The compliance officer should be sufficiently neutral from 
the board and upper management to make independent decisions concerning 
the oversight of the compliance program.  The compliance officer must 
have the authority to review all documents and other information that is 
relevant to compliance activities.92  Boards should maintain open lines of 
communication and reporting within management and between the board, 
compliance officers, and consultants in order to ensure timely and candid 
reports for those responsible for the compliance program.93  For example, in 
McCall, the complaint alleged that the board was knowledgeable of senior 
management’s efforts to devise schemes to improperly increase revenues 
and profits and to perpetuate a management philosophy that provided strong 
incentives for employees to commit fraud.94  A neutral and autonomous 
compliance officer could have responded to the misconduct and addressed 
the situation in a candid manner.   
The compliance officer must have adequate financial resources and 
personnel to implement all aspects of the compliance program.  
Compliance-related responsibilities should be assigned across all 
appropriate levels of the organization, and employees need to be held 
accountable for meeting compliance-related objectives during performance 
reviews.95  This will ensure that there is accountability for proper 
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implementation or oversight of the compliance program.  Where there is 
poor distribution of responsibility and authority for accountability beyond 
the compliance officer, implementation may lag.96  All employees need to 
be held accountable for compliance, and this can be enhanced by creating 
incentives—both positive and negative—for complying with the 
organization’s policies and procedures.   
3.  Preventing and Responding to Violations 
One of the most important elements of an effective compliance program 
is organization-wide training on compliance standards and procedures, 
including remedial training as needed.97  Specifically, there should be 
training on identified risk areas particular to the organization, as well as an 
educational program to assess those risks.98 
The oversight of the compliance program occurs in the context of 
significant regulatory and industry developments that impact the 
organization not only as a health care organization but also more broadly as 
a corporate entity.99  Therefore, the board must be kept apprised of 
significant regulatory and industry developments and must structure the 
compliance program to address those changing risks.100 
The compliance program should be monitored and audited periodically to 
evaluate its effectiveness.101  Monitoring may provide early identification of 
program or operational weaknesses and could substantially reduce exposure 
to government or whistleblower claims.102  One effective method for 
monitoring is the performance of regular, periodic compliance audits by 
internal or external auditors.103  Under the SOA, for instance, employers are 
required to establish audit committees and to adopt procedures for the 
confidential and anonymous reporting of questionable accounting or 
auditing practices.104  In addition to evaluating the organization’s 
conformity with specific regulatory rules or the legality of business 
arrangements, an effective compliance program periodically reviews 
whether program elements have been satisfied.   
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The organization must respond appropriately to deficiencies or suspected 
non-compliance.105  Failure to abide by the compliance program, violation 
of laws, and other types of misconduct can threaten the organization’s status 
as a reliable and trustworthy provider of health care.106  In addition, failure 
to respond to a known deficiency or suspected violation may be considered 
an aggravating factor in evaluating the organization’s potential liability for 
the underlying problem.107  In McCall, several “red flags” such as audit 
discrepancies, a whistleblower action, and an extensive criminal 
investigation indicated that the board was, or should have been, aware of 
the fraud.108  Similarly in Abbott, the board of directors knew about a six-
year history of non-compliance and took no corrective action.109   
The board’s duty of care requires that it explore whether procedures are 
in place to respond to allegations of misconduct and whether management 
promptly initiated corrective measures.110  Many organizations will take 
disciplinary action when employee conduct violates the organization’s code 
of conduct and policies.111  Any disciplinary measures should be enforced 
uniformly.112  The organization also must have policies in place that address 
the appropriate protection of whistleblowers and those accused of 
misconduct.113  In order for a compliance program to work, employees must 
be able to ask questions and to report problems.114  In fulfilling its duty of 
care, the board should have a process in place to encourage such 
constructive communication.115 
Legal risk may exist not only based on conduct under scrutiny, but also 
on actions taken by the organization in response to an investigation.  In 
addition to potential obstruction of a government investigation, the 
organization may face charges by employees for unlawful retaliation or 
violation of employee rights.  For such responses, the board should confirm 
that processes and policies have been developed in consultation with legal 
counsel and are well communicated and understood across all levels of the 
organization. 
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The board should fully understand management’s process for evaluating 
and responding to identified violations of the organization’s policies, as 
well as violations of federal or state laws.116  In addition, the board should 
receive sufficient information to evaluate the appropriateness of the 
organization’s response.117  Boards should have policies governing when to 
report probable violations to government authorities.118  Federal law 
encourages organizations to self disclose wrongdoing, but boards should 
work with legal counsel to develop a policy on when and whether to make 
those disclosures.119 
4.  Compliance and Reporting Tailored to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
To avoid prosecution under the SOA, an employer should adopt a 
protocol by which employees may report workplace violations of 
accounting and securities laws.  As a preliminary matter, employers should 
train all employees, particularly managers and supervisors, about the SOA’s 
provisions.  Employers should communicate to employees that the company 
has a “zero tolerance” policy regarding violations of securities and other 
laws.  The zero tolerance policy must be embraced not only by the upper 
management, but also by supervisory and non-supervisory employees.  
Employers should also consider adopting and implementing policies that 
encourage reporting and that discourage retaliation in response to employee 
reporting.  To be effective, such policies should include the following 
information: 
• What constitutes material violations, adapting language 
from 18 U.S.C. sections 1341, 1343, 1344, and 1348; 
• How to report and to whom to report (with several 
alternatives); 
• How the report will be investigated; and, 
• How violations will be addressed. 
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It is imperative that an employer’s reporting policy contain provisions for 
confidential or anonymous reporting.  The policy should state the 
employer’s intention to keep reports of violations confidential (subject to 
such disclosure as may be required to investigate the complaint), remedy 
any violative behavior, and/or to respond to governmental agency inquiries. 
Employers should take efforts to distribute a copy of the policy to all 
employees on a periodic basis.  The policy should also be posted in 
prominent locations around the office and should be given to the 
independent auditing committee.  The prohibition against retaliation should 
be included in bolder print.  After distributing the policy, the employer 
should have all of its employees sign a receipt or acknowledgment form.  
This form should be maintained in their personnel file, along with 
employment manuals and non-competition agreements. 
It is also important that numerous persons, not only employee 
supervisors, receive reports of violations.  Employers are advised to treat 
complaints seriously, investigate the allegations thoroughly with trained 
investigators, and then take appropriate actions designed to end any 
violations.  Those responsible for investigating reported violations should 
commence investigation promptly and aggressively. 
Employers should establish a procedure for documenting investigations.  
Information that should be documented includes the identities of 
interviewed witnesses and witnesses who were not interviewed or who 
refused to be interviewed.  The investigator should write a summary of each 
witness’s testimony and should keep a log of reviewed documents.  In 
addition, the investigator should prepare a succinct written conclusion of the 
investigation and record any remedial steps taken.  Finally, employers 
should hold supervisors and employees accountable for any inappropriate 
behavior that actually or potentially constitutes harassment or retaliation. 
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5.  Additional Considerations Regarding Corporate Compliance 
Enhanced corporate governance and compliance do more than mitigate 
risk and reduce fraud and abuse.  Compliance programs foster a sense of 
trust in investors and in the public.  An effective compliance program 
outlines policies and procedures for recognizing and reducing risk of health 
care fraud and abuse, which in turn, increases trust and confidence on all 
levels of the organization among employees, staff, and directors.  A 
compliance program also reduces the likelihood of a qui tam lawsuit 
because employees are more likely to report violations within the 
organization when they know policies exist to protect them against 
retaliation. 
The OIG Guidance is a good starting place for developing organizational 
compliance, but it does not go far enough in pointing out the real risks of 
non-compliance examined in Caremark and its progeny.  The OIG 
Guidance does not detail the real and personal financial risk that directors 
face for compliance violations.  For example, the OIG Guidance suggests 
that directors face liability only in “extraordinary circumstances”; however, 
case law, such as that found in McCall and Abbott, suggests that something 
less than extreme circumstances may expose directors to personal liability.  
While the government may not pursue directors except under extraordinary 
circumstances, shareholder derivative suits and whistleblower suits expose 
directors to increased scrutiny in monitoring the affairs of the corporation. 
Compliance violations have numerous consequences.  The government 
has devoted substantial resources to ferreting out health care fraud and 
abuse.  Penalties for failure to oversee a proper compliance program 
include, but are not limited to, treble damages, civil monetary penalties of 
$11,000 per false claim, exclusion from federal and state health care 
programs, and personal liability for directors.  Private whistleblowers play 
an active role in identifying fraudulent practices within a health care 
organization and are also eligible for a potentially large pay-off.  An 
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organization may receive significantly reduced sanctions upon conviction of 
criminal wrongdoing if it has adopted an effective compliance program. 
Consequences of non-compliance extend beyond the individual health 
care organization and board of directors.  Taxpayers bear the burden of 
funding the increased budget needed for government prosecutorial action.  
Penalizing an organization by excluding them from federal and state health 
care programs such as Medicare and Medicaid hurts both the organization 
and Medicare and Medicaid recipients.  Exclusion from programs like 
Medicare and Medicaid is a harsh penalty for health care organizations that 
derive a significant amount of reimbursement from these programs.  
Exclusion also affects Medicare and Medicaid patients by limiting access to 
health care at these organizations.  Non-compliance also encourages 
whistleblower actions because they come with a potentially large payoff for 
the individual who reports misconduct to the government.  Encouraging 
health care organizations to identify and prevent fraud and abuse benefits 
the organization, itself, as well as members of society. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The health care industry operates in a heavily regulated environment with 
multiple high-risk areas.  Health care organizations and boards of directors 
face unique challenges, especially in light of the government’s increased 
oversight and focus on health care fraud, waste, and abuse.  Caremark and 
its progeny, as well as the recent passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
increase the level of detail directors must pay to corporate compliance and 
oversight in carrying out their duties.  Failure to comply with federal and 
state statutes and regulations can be devastating for a health care 
organization facing the resulting penalties.  In addition to criminal and civil 
monetary penalties, health care providers that have defrauded federal health 
care programs may be excluded from participation in federal and state-
sponsored health care programs.  Exclusion from health care programs is 
damaging to organizations because of vital role such programs play in 
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funding health care.  The crippling effects of financial penalties and 
exclusion from federal programs have been the death knell for health care 
organizations.  The focus on “corporate responsibility” via federal and state 
statutes and judicial law places additional pressure on health care 
organizations to implement and carry out effective corporate-compliance 
programs.  The “good old days” of sitting around the boardroom smoking 
cigars and talking politics are gone.  Instead of being filled with cigar 
smoke, today’s boardroom is filled with the ever present need for board 
diligence regarding the organization’s operations—with thoughtful 
consideration about significant decisions affecting the organization—and 
with enhanced candor encouraging all board members to engage in open 
discussion and to bring prospective issues to light in a timely manner. 
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